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 ABSTRACT 
 
 This thesis contains three published papers related to modeling a Human in the 
Loop (HITL) operator interacting with a system of autonomous vehicles in 
Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance (ISR) type Scenarios.  The thesis 
begins with an empirical study of one such actual system, moves to a narrow-scope 
detailed experimental software simulation introducing probabilistic models and 
culminates in experimental investigation using a time dependent information tracking 
function with a set of analytically tractable probabilistic models.  
This first paper, entitled, “Experimental Study of Information Load on 
Operators of Semi-Autonomous Systems” presents a set of experimental results 
studying the relationship between Human in the Loop performance and user workload 
in the RoboFlag test-bed. Operators played a series of games to evaluate performance 
as a function of information load (speed and number of vehicles).  Results showed a 
positive relationship between game speed and total score.  In addition operators 
reported using more automation as number of robots increased but trusting automation 
less as game speed increased.      
  The second paper, entitled “Modeling Tradeoffs in Decisions by Operators 
Controlling Autonomous Vehicles” presents the results of two decision-making 
experiments and two operator decision models for an Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) type mission. The first experiment used 25 possible scenarios, 
each of which included enough trials to allow a formal statistical model to be derived. 
The distribution of operator decision data was modeled with a binomial distribution as 
a function of environmental variables. An optimal decision-making policy was also 
prescribed for all scenarios.  Results show good agreement between operator data and 
the optimal decision-making policy in most scenarios, except when the relative utility 
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between the choices was similar.  Lower order probabilistic models using conditional 
probabilities and Gaussian random variables are also derived; results show a strong 
ability to use lower order models for operator decisions. The second experiment 
presented operators with the same binary decision, but from a more general choice of 
90 possible scenarios.  This allows the evaluation of the probabilistic model as data 
becomes sparse.  Operator data from the second experiment was successfully binned 
and compared to the results of first experiment, demonstrating consistent operator 
decision-making between experiments. 
  The final paper, entitled “Operator Decision Modeling for Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Type Scenarios with a Time Dependent Information 
Function” presents a model of operator + vehicle interaction for a simplified 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance type mission utilizing a time dependent 
information function for target identification. The model is developed and evaluated 
using operator decision-making experiments where an operator controls a friendly 
uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) tasked with identifying enemy targets within a two-
dimensional map.  Operators must make two decisions: 1) which target to choose first, 
and 2) if and when to task the UAV to the second target to start data collection. Two 
sets of experimental data were collected. In all experimental scenarios, target choice 
and time on target were recorded. The data was analyzed in order to develop an 
analytically tractable model of operator choice. An optimal decision-making policy 
was also prescribed for all scenarios and compared to the operator data.  Finally a both 
tabular and lower order probabilistic model developed to model decision making in 
this experiment.   
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PREFACE 
 
 Any great expenditure of effort for which an individual is accorded respect 
affords that individual, at least temporarily, an audience; a chance to express one’s 
opinion and to have others listen. Therefore, this is my opportunity to express my 
opinion and to have you, the reader, give it pause for thought. 
 We stand at the crossroad of a new century and a historical turning point the 
likes of which have been previously unknown to the West: the rise and eventual 
dominance of the East in economic, cultural, social, political and military power.  As 
economists are fond to point out, the best military defense is a strong economy.  A 
strong economy trumps everything - a large standing army, a militaristic culture, or 
even an extremely advanced arms industry - everything, because only a strong 
economy provides the lifeblood that makes military dominance possible to maintain in 
the long run3.  Unfortunately, the West, and the United States in particular, have lost 
their economic vitality.  At Purchasing Power Parity China has already achieved 70% 
of the GDP of the United States and yet China continues growing at three to four times 
the rate.  It is not a question of if China and the Asian Bloc will come to dominate the 
world power structure, but rather how the United States will react.   
 Although I would like to offer the hope for a positive outcome, the political 
events of this new century in combination with the vast influence of the deeply 
entrenched Military-Industrial Complex (made famous in President Eisenhower’s 
farewell address4) give me grave cause for concern as to the direction the United 
                                                 
3 One may look at the historical example of North Korea and South Korea as empirical evidence of this 
point.  At the end of the Korean War in 1953, North Korea enjoyed economic and military dominance 
over South Korea.  Just slightly more than 50 years later, South Korea’s economy has outstripped North 
Korea’s some 25 fold and despite the North’s larger troop count and absolute commitment to 
militarization, its ability to mount a meaningful invasion of South Korea has now been relegated to 
history.    
4 January 16th, 1971 
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States is choosing to take5.  Nonetheless, I take this opportunity to implore the reader 
to consider carefully how actions and complacency on all our parts may be 
contributing to this chain of events.  We as engineers must make it a priority to ensure 
that the knowledge we create is used towards good ends. No amount of clever 
engineering will ever make up for the value of life lost through unnecessary war 
making.   
 
 
         Ithaca, New York 
         July 2006 
                                                 
5 The reader is encouraged to read Blow Back and The Sorrows of Empire by Chalmers Johnson for a 
very detailed, scholarly and objective examination of the events leading up to current conditions.   
